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A Heuristic Approach to Network Hardening Using Attack Graphs 
Tania Islam 
In defending against multi-step attacks, network hardening answers the following impor-
tant question: Which vulnerabilities must be removed from a network in order to prevent 
attackers from compromising critical resources while minimizing the implied cost in terms 
of availability or administrative efforts. Existing approaches to network hardening derive a 
logic proposition to represent the negation of the attack goal in terms of initially satisfied 
security conditions. In the disjunctive normal form (DNF) of the logic proposition, each 
disjunction then provides a viable solution to network hardening. However, such solutions 
suffer from an exponential time complexity. In this thesis, we study heuristic methods 
for solving this important problem with reasonable complexity. We evaluate our proposed 
solutions through extensive experiments. The results show that our solution can achieve 
reasonably good network hardening results in significantly less time than the optimal so-
lution would require. Also, for scenarios where additional cost constraints may render a 
perfectly secure network hardening solution impossible, we extend our heuristic methods 
to partial hardening solutions. Such solutions can provide best possible improvement in 
terms of security under given cost constraints. 
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1.1 Background and Motivation 
Protecting computer networks in enterprises and critical infrastructures against malicious 
intrusions is crucial to the economy and national security. Various intrusion detection sys-
tems (IDSs) and vulnerability scanners have been developed to protect networks against 
malicious attacks. Nonetheless, we have seen an increasing threat from network intrusions 
in terms of both scale and severity despite over twenty years of research in vulnerability 
analysis and intrusion detection. 
One of the reasons to the increasing threat from network attacks is that most existing 
tools can only identify vulnerabilities or attacks in isolation. On the contrary, attackers usu-
ally exploit multiple correlated vulnerabilities to evade detection or firewalls or to gradually 
elevate their privilege in a network. The isolated alerts or vulnerabilities reported by IDSs 
and vulnerability scanners thus only provide a partial picture about multi-step sophisticated 
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attacks. The sheer number of alarms raised by those tools will usually render them difficult 
to analyze and eventually lead them to be completely ignored by security administrators. 
Moreover, a vulnerability analysis often assumes that all identified weaknesses will be 
immediately removed. However, in practice, this is usually not the case. The removal of 
vulnerabilities is often complicated by environmental factors (the availability of software 
patches or hardware upgrades), cost factors (in terms of money or administrative efforts), 
or mission factors (the demand for availability and usability). In many cases, a security 
administrator may have to live with some of the discovered vulnerabilities. A critical ques-
tion thus naturally arises: Which vulnerabilities should be removed first in order to prevent 
attacks while reducing the implied costs? This question is usually named the network hard-
ening problem. 
There exist solutions for network hardening using attack graphs [53,61] (the next chap-
ter will give a detailed review of the literature). Attack graph is a well accepted model 
for correlated vulnerabilities. By correlating vulnerabilities through common pre- or post-
conditions, an attack graph can help a security administrator to understand the threat of 
potential multi-step attacks and to determine potential attack paths, which may be regarded 
as an automated penetration testing. However, attack graph does not directly provide a 
solution for removing identified threats. Finding the solution by hands for large networks 
whose attack graphs are usually very complicated is generally not feasible. 
On the other hand, an automated hardening method regards correlated vulnerabilities 
as combinations of Boolean variables [61]. To secure critical resources represented as goal 
conditions in an attack graph, a logic proposition is derived based on the attack graph. 
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The logic proposition is then converted to its disjunctive normal form (DNF) in the set of 
initially satisfied conditions. Then a least-cost network hardening options can be chosen 
among the conjunctive clauses in the DNF. However, finding a minimum-cost solution in 
this way is expensive, because the length of a derived logic proposition may be exponential 
in the number of initial conditions or in the size of an attack graph. Nonetheless, con-
sidering the practical impact of the problem, heuristic solutions are clearly desirable for 
obtaining low-cost hardening solutions within a reasonable time limit. 
1.2 Thesis Contribution 
This thesis focuses on finding feasible solutions for network hardening when given time or 
cost constraints do not allow for an optimal solution to be derived. More specifically, our 
main contributions are the following. 
• We point out limitations of existing attack graph-based network hardening approaches. 
We show that such methods have an exponential worst case complexity which pre-
vents them from scaling to large networks. We also point out that given constraints 
on the cost of hardening solutions may lead such methods to produce no solution at 
all, which is clearly not desirable. 
• We study a series of heuristic algorithms as candidate solutions. The algorithms 
all aim to find a set of initially satisfied security conditions for disabling such that 
potential attacks on critical resources may be prevented while the cost for disabling 
such conditions remains reasonably low. We show the worst case scenario of each 
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such candidate algorithm and point out limitations of the algorithms. 
• We propose the main heuristic approach based on insights obtained while studying 
the candidate solutions. This approach sorts conditions based on not only cost but 
also the number exploits requiring that condition, and it includes a forward search in 
the attack graph with a limited degree of backtracking. We instantiate the approach 
as two heuristic algorithms with slightly different ways of sorting the conditions. 
• We also study situations where a perfectly secure hardening solution cannot be de-
rived due to given cost constraints. We extend our heuristic approaches to a partial 
hardening solution based on a probabilistic security metric. This solution reduces the 
risk of potential multi-step attacks to the least possible degree with respect to given 
cost constraints. 
• We conduct comprehensive experiments to compare the performance of our solu-
tions with the optimal solution in terms of the cost of resulted hardening solutions 
and the time taken to compute such solutions. We vary different parameters in gen-
erating random attack graphs, such as the size of attack graphs, the number of initial 
conditions, the ratio between exploits and conditions, and the ratio between different 
relationships among exploits and conditions. All results show that our solution can 
produce reasonably good hardening solutions while taking significant less time limit 
than exhaustive search does. 
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1.3 Organization of the Thesis 
In Chapter 2, we discuss related work on attack graph and its construction, analysis and 
different applications where it has been successfully applied. In Chapter 3, we review the 
background knowledge of our work. We describe attack graphs and related concepts, and 
we formally define the network hardening problem and the partial hardening problem. In 
Chapter 4, we first study candidate solutions which provide us critical insights to our main 
heuristic solutions. We then present our main heuristic solutions in details and analyze 
potential difficulties in reducing the cost and how our proposed algorithms can overcome 
them. We also discuss the proposed partial hardening solutions in this chapter. In Chapter 
5, we show experimental results on the comparison between our heuristic methods and the 
optimal method for network hardening with respect to both the cost of computed solutions 





In this chapter, we review the literature on the generation, analysis, and application of attack 
graphs. We also discuss other work that are relevant to our research. 
2.1 Attack Graph 
For protecting systems against malicious attacks, there exist various intrusion detection 
systems (IDSs) and vulnerability scanners, such as Nessus [16], Nmap [35], Snort [52], 
Cisco security scanner, SATAN [20], System Scanner by ISS [26], CyberCop [10] and 
Computer Oracle and Password System (COPS) [19]. Those solutions are being applied in 
real world networks and they can render attacking such networks much more difficult than 
without such solutions in place. However, existing solutions usually identify vulnerabilities 
or attacks in isolation, which only provides a partial picture about securing a network since 
today's attackers typically employ sophisticated multi-step attacks. 
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Phillips and Swiler [45] propose the concept of attack graph and they also present a 
graph-based approach for generating attack graphs. In their model, the inputs of an at-
tack graph include configuration files, attacker profiles, and a database of attack templates, 
which must be manually created. The nodes of the attack graph are attack templates in-
stantiated with particular users and machines, whereas edges are labeled by probabilities 
of success or cost of attacks. The graphs can be analyzed to find the shortest paths between 
given start and end nodes. The idea of grouping similar nodes is mentioned although the 
correctness critically depends on identical configuration among such nodes. 
Another model [58] expresses attack graphs with the require and provide approach 
using the precondition and postcondition of each exploit. For each successful attack, the 
attacker can obtain the ability to perform more attack steps so each successful exploitation 
increases his/her capabilities in launching new attacks. An attack specification language 
JIGSAW is used in describing attack steps. The language requires low level details of 
capabilities and requirements of attacks which may be hard to obtain. This require and 
provide approach brings flexibility in discovering potentially new attack scenarios. Using 
this language and the given specifications, an IDS and attack analysis system can be created. 
In [50], model checking is applied to the analysis of multi-step network attacks. Known 
vulnerabilities on network hosts, connectivity between hosts, initial capabilities of the at-
tacker are described as states and exploits as transitions between states. This model is given 
to a model checker as its input and the reachability in terms of given goal states is given 
as a query. The model checker then produces a counterexample if a sequence of exploits 
can lead to goal states. Such a sequence of exploits indicates a potential attack that must be 
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avoided to secure the network. The term topological vulnerability analysis is coined in [51] 
which provides more details on how connectivity should be modeled at different layers. 
In [29, 53], model checking is used for a different purpose, that is to enumerate all 
attack paths. A modified model checker is used to take as input the finite-state machine 
created from network information. The model checker provides all counterexamples to a 
query about the safety of the goal states. Those are essentially the possible attack paths. 
Other types of analysis are also discussed by the authors, including how to find a cut set 
in the attack graph, such that goal conditions can no longer to reached. The problem of 
finding the minimum possible attack that leads to the given goal conditions is shown to be 
intractable. One apparent limitation of this approach is that all attack paths are explicitly 
enumerated in its result, which leads to a combinatorial explosion. 
A monotonic assumption is adopted in [1] to address the scalability of model checking-
based approaches. It states exploits will never cause the attacker to relinquish any pre-
viously obtained privileges. Attack paths can then be implicitly modeled as paths in a 
directed graph including exactly one copy of each exploit and its pre- and post-conditions; 
edges interconnect exploits to their conditions. The assumption thus reduces the complex-
ity of attack graph from exponential to polynomial in the number of hosts. However, it also 
makes some attacks impossible if they disable services or invalidate vulnerabilities. Attack 
graphs are generated using a two-pass search that first links exploits by starting from the 
attacker's initial state and then removes those irrelevant states by searching backward from 
the goal state. 
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In [39] the authors proposed a logic-based approach to attack graph generation to im-
prove the efficiency. Using this approach, the generated attack graph always has a poly-
nomial size in the size of analyzed network. A Network security analyzer MulVAL [40] 
is used to build the attack graph generation tool. Here, each node of the attack graph 
represents a logical statement and the edges define the relationship between network con-
figuration and what the privileges the attacker potentially could gain. Here, the main focus 
is on the root causes of the attack. Using this logical attack graph representation, one can 
obtain all the possible attack scenarios using a simple depth-first search. Using this repre-
sentation, it can also be ensured that an attack graph will always have a polynomial size in 
the size of the network. 
Attack graph has many different applications, such as the proactive detection of po-
tential multi-step attacks, the realtime detection of anomalies, the network hardening, and 
computer forensic [29]. As attack graphs can reveal potential intrusions beforehand, it can 
be used to incorporate security policies and IDS models into vulnerability scanning and 
then to perform analysis and upgrade the defense system accordingly. It can be used to do 
a cost/benefit analysis by finding the least cost way for hardening an insecure network. In 
Forensics, attack graph is also use to find probable attacks and to assess damages of the 
system [56]. For taking legal action against the attacker, the analyst needs to show attack 
steps as evidence. Using attack graph, the whole attack paths can be matched to data ex-
tracted from IDS logs. In [22] the authors showed informal attack graphs are helpful in the 
iterative design of a system used to protect sensitive data at a customer site. 
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2.2 Network Hardening 
In [53] a minimum critical set is computed which is basically the minimum set of exploits 
in the attack graph by disabling which we can harden the network. The minimum critical 
attack set is essentially the concept of a cut set in graph theory. In [1], the authors propose 
an algorithm called findMinimul to find the attack that takes the least number of steps from 
the initial state to the goal condition to launch an attack. Another such approach proposed 
in [29] introduces the minimum critical attack set in a more scalable way. However, all 
these solutions cannot be directly used by system administrators as the set of exploits to 
be disabled are unavoidable consequences of other exploits, which must be disabled in the 
first place. 
The concept of network hardening with respect to initially satisfied conditions is first 
introduced in [36]. It is argued that disabling such initial conditions is a better choice 
than minimum critical sets with respect to the need of security administrators. To disable 
exploits in the critical set, we have also disable the causes of such exploits, which ultimately 
leads to a set of security conditions that are initially satisfied and do not depend on others. 
Such initial conditions are only the pre-condition of some exploits but they are not the post 
condition of any exploit. This indicates that these conditions can be disabled independently. 
Therefore, an effective hardening measure is to find the set of initial conditions disabling 
which can disable the goal conditions. 
This thesis is mainly inspired by the approach in [36] of finding a set of initial condi-
tions that can disable the given goal conditions and has the minimum cost. In that work, 
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the authors represent given critical network resources as a logic proposition of initial con-
ditions. To build the logic proposition, each vulnerability is first viewed as a Boolean 
variable. The two connectives AND and OR are used where AND is used between condi-
tions required by the same exploit, and OR is used between the exploits implying the same 
condition. A true condition means a condition is satisfied and false condition means it is 
disabled for hardening the network. The hardening option is made explicit by transform-
ing the logic proposition into its disjunctive normal form (DNF). Each of the disjunctive 
form is then treated as a solution to network hardening. The minimum-cost solution can be 
chosen among these options. However, as we shall show, the procedure has an unavoidable 
exponential worst-case complexity, because its result is exponential. So, for larger net-
works, enforcing this approach will be costly or even impossible depending on the number 
of hosts and their connectivity. Our work addresses this issue with a heuristic approach that 
yields reasonably good results in significantly less time . 
2.3 Security Metric 
The concept and overview of security metrics is given in [28] with methods of defining, 
creating, and utilizing security metrics in enterprises. Also, relevant issues of security met-
rics are given in the 2001 Workshop on Information Security System Scoring and Rank-
ing [2]. Existing standardization efforts include the assessment of methods for measuring 
the level of computer security [37], the security metrics guide for information technology 
systems [57]. Some properties of security metric are also discussed in [11,12,38]. They 
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use MTTF and Markov model to measure the security of a network, which is based on 
the success rate for an attacker that is distributed exponentially. In [3] the authors dis-
cussed using minimum efforts for executing exploits as a metric. Another approach uses 
the weakest attack model showing the least number of conditions for an attack as a met-
ric [44]. The attack surface concept is a metric for measuring the vulnerability in software 
against potential attacks [41^13]. 
Due to its capability of modeling correlated vulnerabilities, attack graph is used as the 
basis of developing network security metric in [62]. A framework for a security metric is 
proposed which includes several principles and methodologies. There are several general 
requirements that any security metric should satisfy. That is, a longer path leading to the 
attack goal means better security; multiple attack paths are less secure than any of the 
paths alone; executing an exploit may change the difficulty of executing another exploit, 
even if the two do not directly depend on each other in the attack graph; the security of a 
network should be measured against all relevant resources with different weights and each 
reconfiguration may incur a certain cost that must be considered together with security. 
The framework is instantiated as an attack resistance metric in [4]. The proposed attack 
resistance metrics is based on two compositions assuming the attack resistant either as 
a real number or a set of initial security conditions. This metric helps to quantify the 
comparison among the security of different network configurations. Another work defines a 
probabilistic security metric based on the same framework [60]. The goal is to calculate an 
overall score for the network and use it to measure how secure the given critical resources 
in a network are. To define the basic metric, each exploit and condition is associated with 
a probability to measure the intrinsic likelihood of the exploit. The value assignments 
for these individual probabilities are based on some basic measurements, such as, how 
difficult the exploit is, which are available in standards like CVSS [9]. Then, a cumulative 
probability score is calculated as the probability of an exploit to be successfully exploited 
in an attack graph based on the probability of other exploits. To calculate the cumulative 
scores, the conjunction and disjunction relationships among exploits must be distinguished. 
Cycles are handled during calculating the probabilities of exploits. 
2.4 Other Related Work 
A parallel research topic is alert correlation, which reconstructs multi-step attack scenarios 
from isolated alerts. They may employ prior knowledge about attack strategies [8,14,15,18] 
or the causal relationships between attacks [7,32,33]. Those methods may either aggregate 
alerts with similar attributes [6,13,55,59] or statistical patterns [30,46]. Hybrid approaches 
also exist that combine different techniques for better results [33,47,63]. Alerts missed 
by IDSs can be tolerated by clustering alerts with similar attributes [34], and incomplete 
knowledge can be pieced together through statistical analyses [46,47]. 
Alert correlation techniques are also used for other purposes such as to relate alerts 
to the same thread of attacks [25]. The privacy issue of intrusion detection and in par-
ticular alert correlation is investigated in [64], Alert correlation is a potential method for 
dealing with insider attacks in [48,49]. Existing efforts on integrating information from 
different sources exist, such as the model in M2D2 [31] and the Bayesian network-based 
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approach [65]. Some commercial products claim to support realtime analyses of alerts such 




In this section, we briefly review some important concepts that are relevant to our further 
discussions. First, we introduce attack graph and its related concepts. Second, we formalize 
the network hardening problem. Third, we introduce the probabilistic security metric in 
order to make our later discussion on partial hardening self-contained. Finally, we review 
standard heuristic approaches and explain how they can potentially be integrated with our 
heuristics. 
3.1 Attack Graph 
An attack graph is a graphical model of inter-dependent vulnerabilities on networked hosts. 
An attack graph is a directed graph whose set of nodes is partitioned into two classes, 
namely, exploits and security conditions (or simply conditions). An exploit is typically 
represented as a predicate v(hs, hd), where hs and hd represent two connected hosts and v a 
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vulnerability on the destination host hd. A security condition is a predicate c(h), indicating 
the host h satisfies a condition c relevant to one or more exploits. Notice that hs, hd, and 
v are abstract notations that could in practice possess different semantics, for example, hs 
and hd can be host names, IP addresses, and so on, and v can be the name of a vulnerability 
or its ID in a vulnerability database. These are formalized in Definition 1. 
Definition 1 An attack graph G is a directed graph G(E U C. Rr U /?.,;) where the set of 
nodes include E, a set of exploits, and C, a set of conditions, and the set of edges include 
the require relation Rr C C x E and the imply relation Ri C E x C. 
Corresponding to the inter-dependency between exploits and conditions, the two types 
of edges in an attack graph have different semantics. First, the require relation Rr is a 
directed edge pointing from a condition to an exploit, which means the exploit cannot be 
executed unless the condition is satisfied. For example, an exploit v(hs, hd) requires fol-
lowing two conditions, that is the existence of the vulnerability v on hd and the connectivity 
between hs and hd. Second, the imply relation R t pointing from an exploit to a condition 
means executing the exploit will satisfy the condition. Notice that there is no edge directly 
connecting two exploits (or two conditions). 
Figure 1 shows a small example of attack graphs. We assume a simple scenario where 
a file server (host 1) offers the File Transfer Protocol (ftp), secure shell (ssh), and remote 
shell (rsh) services; a database server (host 2) offers ftp and rsh services. The firewall 
only allows ftp, ssh, and rsh traffic from a user workstation (host 0) to both servers. In the 
attack graph, exploits of vulnerabilities are depicted as predicates in ovals and conditions 
as predicates in clear texts. The two numbers inside parentheses denote the source and 
destination host, respectively. The attack graph represents three self-explanatory sequences 
of attacks (attack paths). 
ftp(0,l) usei<0) ftp(0,2) 
Figure 1: An Example of Attack Graph 
Two important semantics of attack graphs are as follows. First, the require relation is 
always conjunctive whereas the imply relation is always disjunctive. More specifically, an 
exploit cannot be realized until all of its required conditions have been satisfied, whereas 
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a condition can be satisfied by any one of the realized exploits. Second, the conditions 
are further classified as initial conditions (the conditions not implied by any exploit) and 
intermediate conditions. An initial condition can be independently disabled to harden a 
network, whereas an intermediate condition usually cannot be [36]. 
To generate an attack graph, two types of inputs are necessary, namely, type graph and 
configuration graph. Type graph represents expert knowledge about the dependency rela-
tionshin between vulnerabilities. On the other hand, configuration eranh represents hosts 
and their connectivity and vulnerability information. We assume the domain knowledge 
required for type graph is available from tools like the Topological Vulnerability Analysis 
(TVA) system, which covers more than 37,000 vulnerabilities taken from 24 information 
sources including X-Force, Bugtraq, CVE, CERT, Nessus, and Snort [27]. On the other 
can be obtained using available network scanning tools, such as the Nessus scanner [17]. 
3.2 The Network Hardening Problem 
i i 
though Figure 1 is a relatively simple scenario with three hosts and four vulnerabilities, 
because multiple interleaved attack paths can lead to the goal condition, an optimal solu-
such a solution by hand may not be trivial, either. As an example of attack paths, the 
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Input: An attack graph G(E IJ C, Rr U Rt) and the goal 
conditions Cg C C 
Output: A solution set L which needs to disable 
Method: 
1. Calculate the smallest cost of the initial conditions 
2. Sort the initial conditions IC according to the cost and sort same cost elements 
according to their effective cost 
3. Make the cost of condition = 0 and cost of exploit = infinity 
4. Set 5 = GenSet(jc) 
5. Make each element of S explored 
6. TVa verse G in BFS manner 
7. For each condition c do 
8. If c is explored 
9. If all the exploits that imply c are explored 
10. Make solution of c = combination of all solutions of exploits implying c 
11. Make cost of c = combination of all the cost of the exploits that imply c 
12. Enqueue all the exploits that require c 
13. Else 
14. Put c back in queue 
15. For each exploit e do 
16. If e is explored 
17. If all the conditions required by e are explored 
18. Make solution of e = smallest cost solution of the condition that required by e 
19. Make cost of e = cost of the smallest cost condition 
20. Enqueue all the conditions that implied by e 
21. Else 
22. Put e back into queue 
23. If the Goal is not disabled 
24. Goto step 4 
25. Return solution of Cg 
Figure 10: The Second Heuristic Approach 
conditions are disabled) or condition (when all of the exploits implying it are disabled). 
More specifically, a condition should be marked as disabled only if all of the exploits 
implying it are explored and disabled; it should be marked explored (but not disabled) if all 
of the exploits implying it are explored but at least one of them is not disabled. Otherwise, 
we cannot make any decision since the unexplored exploit may or may not be disabled in 
the future when we explore it. For an exploit, it should be marked as disabled if at least one 
of the required conditions is disabled; it should be marked explored (but not disabled) if all 
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of the required conditions are explored but not disabled. We cannot make any decision if 
none of the required conditions is explored. 
However, cycles in attack graphs may bring additional difficulties to network hardening 
approaches. For example, consider the attack graph shown in Figure 11, which includes a 
cycle c5 —»• e3 —> c6 —» e4 —• c5. 
In traversing the graph, after we disable el and reach c5, we need to make the decision 
whether c5 should be marked as disabled and explored. As aforementioned, we cannot 
make any decision here since the unexplored exploit e4 implies c5 and e4 may or may not 
be disabled in the future when we explore it. Similarly, when we proceed from c3 and c4 
to e3, since e3 depends on c5 that is still not explored, we cannot make any decision. Such 
an inter-dependency between c5 and e4 thus will cause the algorithm to stop. However, we 
can easily see that in this particular case, e3 and e4 can never be exploited if el is disabled. 
cl 
Figure 11: An Example of Cycle in Attack Graph 
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Therefore, we should simply regard all nodes inside the cycle as disabled. 
More generally, the following enumerates the different cases we may have in handling 
cycles. 
• As illustrated in the left-hand side of Figure 12 (0 indicates disabled and 1 not dis-
abled), if we reach a cycle through a condition and if all the exploits required by 
this condition are not disabled, and if no other exploit from outside the cycle can 
satisfy the required conditions inside the cycle, then all the nodes will be considered 
disabled. 
• As illustrated in the right-hand side of Figure 12, if we reach a cycle through a condi-
tion and if all the exploits required by this condition are not disabled, and if any other 
exploit from outside the cycle can satisfy the required condition inside the cycle, then 
all the nodes will be considered not disabled. 
• As illustrated in the left-hand side of Figure 13, if we reach a cycle through an exploit 
and if all the conditions required by this exploit are not disabled, and if no other 
exploit from outside the cycle can satisfy the required condition inside the cycle, 
then all the nodes will be considered disabled. 
• As illustrated in the right-hand side of Figure 13, if we reach a cycle through an 
exploit and if all the conditions which required by this exploit are not explored, and 
if any other exploit from outside the cycle can satisfy the required condition inside 
the cycle, then all the nodes will be considered not disabled. 
42 
0 ^ J 0 
Figure 12: Case 1 and 2 
4.4 Partial Network Hardening 
In hardening a network, fully harden the network to disable the goal condition is not always 
an option. Sometimes this may require such a high cost that it outweighs the security risk. 
We consider a simple model where a constraint is given as the highest amount of cost that 
can be accepted for any hardening solution. With such a constraint, a network may not be 
fully hardened since the optimal solution may have a cost higher than the given constraint. 
The only remaining choice is a best effort approach in reducing the likelihood of attacks. 
We employ the security metric introduced in previous sections to measure such a likelihood. 
We then extend our previous approach to a partial hardening solution for reducing the risk 
of, instead of eliminating, potential attacks on the goal condition. 
In Figure 14, we annotate each exploit in the attack graph with its individual score. All 
the conditions have the individual score of 1, which is omitted. Assume the cost constraint 
is given as 12. We can easily see that the network cannot be fully hardened, as the least-cost 
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Figure 13: Case 3 and 4 
solution is to disable both cl and c2, which has a cost of 14. 
Table 2 and Table 3 show the calculations of the cumulative scores for conditions and 
exploits, respectively. 
Table 2: Cumulative Scores of Conditions 
Condition P(c) P(c) 
cl 1 1 
c2 1 1 
c3 1 1 
c4 1 0.9 
c5 1 0.6 
c6 1 0.4 
c7 1 0.24 
g 1 0.048 
We extend our algorithm in the previous section to provide partial hardening solutions 
for reducing the cumulative score of the goal condition. More precisely, we modify the 
algorithm in such a way that by disabling a node, we change its individual score as zero, 
indicating that the node cannot be reached any longer. We then update the cumulative 
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Figure 14: An Attack Graph with Probability Scores 
scores based on the new individual scores. In doing so, we attempt to search for a solution 
that can yield the least cumulative score for the goal condition, with the cost of the solution 
below the given constraint. 
The algorithm will thus starts with cl, which has the least cost. By disabling cl, we 
change the cumulative score of el, c4, and e4 to be zero (which in this particular case 
basically eliminates the left branch of the attack graph). Table 4 and Table 5 show the 
updated cumulative scores after this partial hardening. We can see that the goal condition 
now has a cumulative score of 0.014, which is smaller than its original value. 
The algorithm will then proceed to disable c2 and c3, respectively (since cl and c2 
together will not satisfy the cost constraint). The cumulative score for the goal condition in 
those two cases is 0.278 and 0.328, respectively. Clearly, the best solution is to disable cl. 
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Table 3: Cumulative Scores of Exploits 
Exploit P(e) P(e) 
el 0.9 0.9 
e2 0.6 0.6 
e3 0.4 0.4 
e4 0.2 0.18 
e5 0.3 0.072 
e6 0.2 0.048 
Table 4: Cumulative Scores of Conditions after Partial Hardening 
Condition p(c) P(c) 
cl 1 1 
c2 1 1 
c3 1 1 
c4 1 0 
c5 1 0.6 
c6 1 0.4 
c7 1 0.072 
g 1 0.014 
The above procedure is more formally described in Figure 15. 
Table 5: Cumulative Scores of Exploits after Partial Hardening 
Exploit P(e) P(e) 
el 0.9 0 
e2 0.6 0.6 
e3 0.4 0.4 
e4 0.2 0 
e5 0.3 0.072 
e6 0.2 0.0144 
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Input: An attack graph G(E U C ^ U Ri) ,the goal and Afford cost ac 
conditions Cg C C 
Output: A solution set L which needs to disable 
Method: 
1. Calculate the smallest cost of the initial conditions 
2. Sort the initial conditions IC according to effective cost 
3. Make the cost of condition = 0 and cost of exploit = infinity 
4. Set S = GenSet(IC) 
5. Make each element of S explored 
6. Traverse G in BFS manner 
7. For each condition c do 
8. If c is explored 
9. If all the exploits that imply c are explored 
10. Make solution of c = combination of all the solutions of the exploits that imply c 
11. Make cost of c = combination of all the cost of the exploits that imply c 
12. If cost c>ac 
13. Put c back to traverse again 
14. Else 
15. Enqueue all the exploits that require c 
16. For each exploit e do 
17. If e is explored 
18. If all the conditions required by e are explored 
19. Make solution of e = smallest cost solution of the condition that required by e 
20. Make cost of e = cost of the smallest cost condition 
21. If cost e>ac 






Enqueue all the conditions that implied by e 
If the Goal is not disabled 
Goto step 4 
Return solution of Cg 
Else 




All experiments are based on a PC equipped with one Intel Core 2 Duo 1.86 GHz CPU, 1 
GB of RAM, Microsoft Windows XP Professional with Service Pack 2. For graph render-
ing we use the Graph Viz visualization package [54]. For development, Netbeans 5.5 and 
jdkl.6.0_01 is used. The main objective of the experiments is to compare the performance 
of the proposed heuristic algorithms and that of the optimal solution, in terms of both time 
taken and quality of the hardening result (that is, the cost of the hardening solution). 
All the synthetic attack graphs were randomly generated using a Java program we de-
veloped. The generation is based on a set of adjustable parameters. These parameters 
control the size of the network, the number of abstract exploits, the number of conditions, 
the relationships between exploits and conditions, the way exploits and conditions are as-
signed to hosts, the choice of goal conditions, and so on. We shall show simulation results 
based on varying choices of such parameters in the rest of this section to demonstrate the 
effectiveness of our algorithms when applied to different types of attack graphs. 
5.1 Performance Comparison Based on Time 
Figure 16 compares the performance of our heuristic approach 1 with that of the optimal 
solution (that is, exhaustive search) in terms of the time taken by the two methods (in mil-
lisecond). The size of attack graphs varies from 10 to 50 nodes. For attack graphs with 50 
nodes, the optimal cost calculation takes approximately 6000 ms for calculating the net-
work hardening solution and our proposed algorithm takes approximately 80 ms to gener-
ate the heuristic solution. We can see the time taken by the optimal solution increases very 
fast, which is as expected, whereas the heuristic algorithm increases significantly slower 
(not quite observable in this figure). The heuristic method thus provides administrators 
with a reasonably efficient solution. 
10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40 42 44 46 48 50 
Number of nodes 
Figure 16: Comparison of Time Taken by the Heuristic Approach 1 and the Optimal Solu-
tion 
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Figure 17 compares the performance of the two heuristic approaches in terms of the 
time taken. The size of attack graphs also varies from 10 to 50 nodes. We also vary 
the distribution of exploits among hosts. One set of the curves correspond to uniform 
distribution and the other set normal distribution. We can see that different distributions of 
exploits has only a small effect on the performance of both approaches. Also, the second 
heuristic approach (that is, to sort initial conditions first based on cost then on effective 
cost) performs slightly better than the first approach. 
Number of Nodes 
Figure 17: Comparison of Time Taken by the Two Heuristic Approaches with Different 
Distributions of Exploits 
Figure 18 compares the cost of solutions produced by the optimal solution and the 
heuristic approach. Although the cost of our solution is relatively higher than the optimal 
solution, the difference is small. Considering the significant gain in terms of performance, 
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our solution has clear advantages over exhaustive search. Also, we can see that the differ-
ence between the two solutions stays relatively stable when the attack graph size increases. 
Number of Nodes 
Figure 18: Comparison of the Cost of Solutions Produced by the Heuristic Approach 1 and 
the Optimal Approach 
Figure 19 compares the cost of different heuristic solutions with exploits assigned ac-
cording to uniform and normal distributions. We can see that, although the cost produced 
by both approaches is slightly lower with the normal distribution than uniform distribution, 
the difference is almost negligible. This indicate both approaches work well for different 
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Figure 19: Comparison of the Cost of Solutions Produced by the Heuristic Approaches 
5.2 Performance Comparison with Varying Number of Ini-
tial Conditions 
Since the cost of network hardening critical depends on the number of initial conditions, we 
study the effect of such number on the performance of our algorithms. Figure 20 compares 
the time taken by heuristic approach 1 and the optimal solution. The trends are very similar 
to Figure 16. Clearly, the heuristic solution has a much better scalability than exhaustive 
search. 
Figure 21 compares the time taken by the two heuristic approaches under different 
distributions of exploits. We can see the difference is minor. Both algorithms scale roughly 
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Number of Initial Conditions 
Figure 20: Comparison of Time Taken by the Heuristic Approach 1 and the Optimal Solu-
tion 
the same when the number of initial conditions increases. 
Figure 22 compares the cost of the solutions produced by the heuristic approach and 
that by the exhaustive search. We can see that difference is relatively small, which indicates 
the effectiveness of our approach. Also, we can see that although the absolute value of the 
difference increases as the number of initial conditions increases (due to the fact that both 
solutions have a higher cost), the relative difference does not change as much. 
Figure 23 compares the cost of the solutions produced by the two heuristic approaches. 
We can see that the difference is negligible. Both approaches produce roughly the same 
result, which indicates that the effectiveness of our solutions are not affected much by the 
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Figure 21: Comparison of Time Taken by the two Heuristic Approaches 
5.3 Performance Comparison with Ratio between Imply/Re-
quire Relations 
We have mentioned that there exists an important semantic difference between the imply 
relation over an exploit and its post-conditions, which is always disjunctive, and the require 
relation between an exploit and its pre-conditions, which is always conjunctive. Therefore, 
the ratio between those two types of relations may affect the way our algorithms search 
the attack graph. To measure such effect, we conduct experiments while varying the ra-
tio of require/imply relations. In Figure 24, we can see that the time taken by both our 
heuristic approach and the exhaustive search increases when the ratio increases. This is be-
cause when each initial condition is required by more exploits, the search starting from the 
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Initial Conditions 
Figure 22: Comparison of the Cost of Solutions Produced by the Heuristic Approach 1 and 
the Optimal Approach 
same number of initial conditions will involve a larger portion of the attack graph and thus 
takes more time. However, the heuristic approach clearly outperforms exhaustive search 
regardless of the ratio. 
In Figure 25, we compare the time taken by the two heuristic approaches under varying 
ratios of require and imply relationships. We can see that the difference is marginal. The 
two heuristic approaches both performs well regardless of the ratio. 
Figure 26 compares the cost of solutions produced by the exhaustive search and that by 
the heuristic approach 1 under varying ratios of require and imply relationships. We can see 
that the cost decreases with both approaches when the ratio increases. This is because when 
each exploit requires more conditions, it is easier to harden the network since disabling one 
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Initial Conditions 
Figure 23: Comparison of the Cost of Solutions Produced by the Heuristic Approach 1 and 
the Optimal Approach 
condition will prevent more exploits. We can see also that the difference between the 
heuristic approach and optimal solution is small, indicating our approach is effective. 
Figure 27 compares the cost of solutions produced by the two heuristic approaches 
under varying ratios of require and imply relationships. We can see that the difference 
between the two heuristic approaches is marginal indicating that both approaches perform 
roughly the same regardless of the ratio. 
56 
0 . 2 0 . 4 0 . 6 0 . 3 1 1 . 2 5 1 . 6 2 , 5 5 
Ratio of require/imply 
Figure 24: Comparison of Time Taken by the Heuristic Approach 1 and the Optimal Solu-
tion with Varying Require/Imply Ratio 
5.4 Performance Comparison with Ratio between Exploits 
and Conditions 
We now study the effect of the ratio between exploits and conditions on the performance 
of our approaches. Figure 28 compares the time taken by the heuristic approach and the 
optimal solution under varying ratio between exploits and conditions. We can see that when 
the number of conditions increases both solutions require more running time. The reason 
lies in the fact that the number of initial conditions also increases. However, we can see 
that the heuristic solution outperforms the exhaustive search regardless of the ratio. 
Figure 29 compares the time taken by both heuristic solutions. We can see that the 
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Figure 25: Comparison of Time Taken by the two Heuristic Approaches with Varying 
Require/Imply Ratio 
second heuristic approach takes slightly more time but the difference is small, so both 
approaches perform well regardless of the ratio. 
Figure 30 compares the cost of solutions produced by the heuristic solution 1 and that 
by the optimal solution. We can see that the cost decreases when the ratio increases. This 
is because when there are more conditions, it is relatively easier to disable each exploit so 
the cost of a solution decreases. We can also see that the difference is small, indicating our 
approach is effective regardless of the ratio. 
Figure 31 compares the cost of solutions produced by the heuristic solutions. We can 
see that the difference is marginal, indicating both approaches perform roughly the same 
regardless of the ratio. 
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Figure 26: Comparison of the Cost of Solutions of the Heuristic Approach 1 and the Opti-
mal Solution with Varying Require/Imply Ratio 
5.5 Performance Evaluation for Partial Network Harden-
ing 
To evaluate our performance of partial network hardening approaches we chose attack 
graphs which have individual probability assigned for each of the nodes then calculate 
the cumulative probability for them. Let all the cost constrain is the 20% of the optimal 
cost solution which is showed in the second figure. Then we calculate the cumulative prob-
abilities for the goal condition and hence compare them to show the reduced value. We 
denote the original cumulative probability of goal condition as P(g) and our calculated one 
as PS(g) in the graph. 
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Figure 27: Comparison of the Cost of Solutions of the Heuristic Approaches with Varying 
Require/Imply Ratio 
5.6 Summary 
From all the experiment results, we can clearly see that the heuristic approaches can pro-
duce a reasonably good solution in significantly less time then exhaustive search. The 
variation in different aspects of attack graphs has only a minor effect on the performance 












Figure 28: Comparison of Time Taken by the Heuristic Approach 1 and the Optimal Solu-
tion with Varying Exploit/Condition Ratio 
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Figure 29: Comparison of Time Taken by the Heuristic Approaches with Varying Exploit/-
Condition Ratio 
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Figure 30: Comparison of the Cost of Solutions of the Heuristic Approach 1 and the Opti-
mal Solution with Varying Exploit/Condition Ratio 
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In this thesis, we have pointed out that existing approaches to network hardening by de-
riving a logic proposition and converting it to its DNF suffer from an exponential time 
complexity. In this thesis, we have studied heuristic methods for solving this important 
problem. We evaluated our proposed solutions through extensive simulations. All results 
have shown that our solution can achieve reasonably good results in significantly less time 
than the exhaustive searches. For scenarios where additional cost constraints may prevent 
a full hardening, we have extended our heuristic methods to a partial hardening solution 
based on probabilistic security metric. Such solutions could provide best possible improve-
ments in terms of security. Our future work include integrating other heuristics to future 
improve the performance, especially for the case of partial hardening. 
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